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“[T]he failure to recognize that doctors and hospitals are
linked by a strong bond of joint production is at the basis of
many hospital inefficiencies.” Harris (1977, p. 475)
1 Introduction
Hospitals are one of the main institutions operating in health care mar-
kets. It is of no surprise that considerable research has been devoted to
understand how they work, both in the economics literature and in other
fields. Previous summaries of the more important findings are reported in
the Handbook of Health Economics (Culyer and Newhouse, 2000) and in
the Elgar Companion to Health Economics (Jones, 2006).
The present chapter presents two distinctive features with respect to
these other surveys. The first one is that we emphasize the separation of
ownership and control in hospitals. In other words, the day-to-day actions
and decisions taken within a hospital are often far from the direct control
of the hospital’s ruling body. As we will see, this view is not new, and
can be traced back to the seminal work of Pauly and Redisch (1973), who
views the hospital as a “physician’s cooperative.” Once this separation is
recognized, performance may be equally related to ownership as to internal
organizational features like individual as well as group incentives or hierar-
chical design. This observation paves the way to the other distinctive feature
of this chapter, namely, to look at hospitals through the lens of teams. Hos-
pitals are entities that have an internal organization characterized by team
work. Hospitals also have to “team up” with special partners, namely payers
of health care provided to patients and patient-referring agents.
Some countries rely mainly on private hospitals, while in other countries
a majority of public hospitals is present. In the first group, we have the
United States and the Netherlands, for example, while in the later group,
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we find countries with national health services (such as the U.K., Italy and
Spain, among others). However, one implication of our view of hospitals
is that the existing differences of the relative prevalence of each possible
ownership structure may in fact have less importance than that deemed in
the received literature. Hence, rather than provide an exhaustive treatment
of these differences, our approach allows us to focus on common – internal
organization – aspects.
The chapter is structured as follows. We will dedicate the next two
chapters to introduce the reader to the more classical approach to hospital,
first as a producer and then as an agent endowed with preferences. Hence,
in Section 2 we address technology issues like output measurement, as well
as economies of scale and scope. In Section 3 we briefly overview different
theories on how the ruling body of the hospital chooses between the differ-
ent technologically feasible options, and on how its preferences over these
options are formed. These theories are based on the usual observation that
many hospitals are non-profit organizations, and propose that the hospital
maximizes some other “utility function”. Also in this chapter, we depart
from this view and explain the notion of the separation of ownership and
control, through the approaches of physician agency (Pauly and Redisch,
1973), and the hospital as an internal market (Harris, 1977). In the latter,
equilibrium of demand and supply of resources is achieved without resorting
to explicit prices. Rather, explicit as well as implicit contracts are used to
govern decision making and resource allocation, i.e., to govern incentives.
We will however argue that the procedure by which contracts themselves
are negotiated and chosen within the hospital, amongst those that are effi-
cient, has received little attention. These approaches motivate our interest
on incentives within the hospital, which we develop in Section 4. We focus
on the framework where two or more agents interact. There, the issues of
observability (the measurement of each team member’s contribution), team
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incentives, and optimal hierarchical design become crucial. In Section 5 we
show that the idea of team interactions can be extended beyond the limits of
the hospital in two main areas. We first address the relationship of hospitals
with third-party payers. In most countries, we find health insurance mecha-
nisms, be they private or public, which assume the responsibility to pay for
care provided to patients. Most models addressing payment rules assume
a single payer. Often, this is not the case, and the degree of economies of
scale may matter to the payment rule. Secondly, we notice that patients ar-
rive at hospital referred by other agents, namely general practitioners (GP).
Therefore, hospitals also have “to team” with GPs, and hospital preferences
will determine how these two parties interact. In Section 6, we turn to the
existing empirical evidence on two important issues discussed in the pre-
vious sections. The first issue is that of the optimal size of the hospital,
which is intimately related to economies of scale and scope. The second
issue is whether ownership really matters in reference to observed perfor-
mance, where we update the evidence provided by Gaynor (2006). Finally,
In Section 7 we discuss and propose challenges for future research.
2 Technology: what does a hospital do?
According to the neoclassical view, a hospital uses resources (inputs) rang-
ing from medical equipment to pharmaceutical products, nurses and doctors.
Combining those resources according to current knowledge and technology,
patients are treated (output). The utilization of resources entails costs and
different combinations of resources may be used to treat similar clinical con-
ditions. Treating patients, on the other hand, leads to revenues. Therefore,
even if several particularities do exist, hospitals can be studied using the
traditional economic apparatus. Namely, issues about size and diversifica-
tion advantages can be addressed. The only difficulty lies in the precise
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definition and measurement of hospital’s output. Let us address this latter
issue first, as it is one of the most challenging.
To answer the simple question “what does a hospital do?”, we need to ob-
serve the sequence of events that take place: The patient arrives at the hospi-
tal either by advice of some health professional (directed in from outpatient
visits, referred by primary care organizations, etc.) or from the patient’s
own initiative (mainly, through a decision to go to the emergency room ser-
vices). When the patient arrives at the hospital (s)he brings with him a
certain initial condition and likely evolution of his health status, which may
depend on its own characteristics. Then, the hospital (the doctor) makes an
assessment of the situation and decides on how many resources to spend on
the patient. The resources the doctor uses include her own time, nurses and
other non-medical personnel, medical equipment and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. The hospital must be organized in such a way that these resources
are available when needed.1 Sickness evolves, given the initial condition and
the resources dedicated to treatment, and a final health outcome emerges.
In this respect, the most distinguishing characteristic of a hospital is the
objective of providing acute illness treatment. This implies that hospitals
have to deliver a service tailored to the specific condition of each patient. In
order to tailor treatment, the doctor gathers information about the patient’s
condition, processes it and takes a decision about the therapeutic path to
be followed. This makes the operation of a hospital quite distinct from that
of traditional business units, where, like in the treatment of chronic illness,
needs are identified well in advance. We believe that the existing literature
has not addressed this distinction in a complete way.
From this brief description, several notions of output may be constructed.
However, almost all studies consider physical measures of activity as the hos-
pital output. This is done for practical reasons. A closer look at the hospital
1The hospital as an inventory in the presence of uncertain demand is addressed below.
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shows that a different approach to empirical modeling may be appropriate,
when feasible. Still, more often than not empirical studies are forced to rely
upon the simple output measures. The most popular (and easy to measure
empirically) is the number of patients treated, and we may refine that by
considering different types of output. A common approach is to divide out-
put into tree activities: inpatient treatments (or discharges),2 outpatient
visits (that is, visits to specialists) and emergency room episodes. In line
with these observations, the classic view of the hospital sees it, naturally, as
a multiproduct unit.
We may also define hospital output according to the type of illness in-
volved in the case of admissions. The need to set a measure of output,
essential to compare performance of hospitals, has led to the creation and
development of patient classification systems, like the Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRG), which are homogeneous episodes of sickness treatment that
group similar clinical situations demanding roughly the same amount of re-
sources.3 They also provide a tool to organize payments to hospitals. The
information system provided by DRGs could even allow for a characteriza-
tion of hospital outputs that takes each DRG as a different output, although
the number of outputs resulting from such a classification would make a full
economic analysis too complex.
The main advantage of these hospital output definitions is the ability to
measure them, even in a crude way. However, a more demanding definition
of the hospital’s output is to see it as a change in the probability distribution
over possible health states of the patient. This measure, in contrast to the
proceeding ones, conveys more a notion of quality than of quantity, and
follows directly from the path the patient takes within the hospital. Its
2Technological change has reduced the hospital stay for several interventions, which in
some cases means patients return home in the same day of intervention.
3Different countries use different names for patient classification systems. We keep here
the term DRG for expositional purposes.
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main difficulty is with observation, as detailed information regarding the
health status of the patient when leaving the hospital is usually unknown,
except for the coarse distinction of live discharge versus death, which leads
directly to the notion of mortality rate as an output measure. When the
patient enters the hospital with a clinical condition, (s)he may receive care
at the hospital. Despite the efforts and resources used, the patient may not
survive. However, the resources used by the hospital were not useless, as
they have increased the probability of survival of the patient compared to
doing nothing. They changed the odds of survival. Thus, the contribution
of the hospital is this change in survival probability. The death of the
patient is a possible outcome even after committing resources to treatment.
Aggregating over patients, the higher likelihood of survival will translate
into a lower mortality rate.4
Besides mortality rates, whenever appropriate data is collected, output
of the hospital can be defined as the expected health gain resulting from
treatment. Additional QALYs (quality-adjusted life-years) as a measure of
output, for example, contemplates both extensions in life and improvements
in quality of life.
The survival probability is, of course, one of the dimensions of interest.
Ideally, one would like to measure the difference in health status with and
without treatment. This is a hard issue, requiring further developments
on both data available and analytic tools. Castelli et al. (2007) propose
an approach taking into account increases in life, weighted by quality, and
adjusting for waiting time until intervention. The approach is demanding
in terms of the information required, however.
Another characteristic of hospitals’ operation is randomness of demand.
4This approach also has the advantage of interpreting death as an output equal to live
discharge - they are just different realizations from the same probability distribution -
thus avoiding the somewhat ad-hoc procedure of treating death within a hospital episode
as an undesirable output (Dismuke and Sena, 2001; Yawe and Kavuma, 2007).
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Daily, weekly and monthly variance in demand for hospital services is con-
siderable. Since hospital care should not be denied to those in need, excess
capacity, on the one hand, and rationing/waiting lists, on the other hand,
accommodate variations in demand. The natural response to demand vari-
ance is to hold some excess capacity to satisfy peak demand (Joskow, 1980;
Gal-Or, 1994; Friedman and Pauly 1981, Carey, 1998).
Let us now turn to the classical issues of optimal size and diversification
advantages. Size advantages can be summarized on the simple notion of
having a lower unit cost the larger the hospital is. This leads to the economic
notion of economies of scale. In simple terms, a hospital has economies
of scale if, by increasing its activity level by some scalar larger than one
(e.g., doubling activity), costs increase less than proportionately (less than
double). If costs increase in line with (more than) activity, with constant
(increasing) average costs, the hospital has constant (decreasing) returns to
scale.
Another important concept is economies of scope. A hospital has economies
of scope whenever producing several outputs entails lower costs than produc-
ing each of them alone. In the case of hospital activity, there are economies
of scope if, for example, having inpatient treatment and emergency room
episodes in the same organization has lower costs than providing the same
levels of care through independent organizations.
The two concepts, economies of scale and economies of scope, are rel-
evant to delineate the size and range of services provided by hospitals. If
economies of scale were never exhausted, one should observe only a few and
very large hospitals. In other words, analysis of economies of scale provides
guidance with regard to the optimal size of the hospital. Since we observe
that hospitals of very different size do survive over time in the same geo-
graphic area, this could mean that economies of scale vanish at some level
of activity.
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Similarly, economies of scope express the advantages of combining differ-
ent types of services. Real world observation suggests that emergency room,
outpatient visits and inpatient activities have economies of scope, as they
are regularly performed by the same organization. Perhaps emergency room
has less pronounced economies of scope with respect to the other two activ-
ities, since we do sometimes observe hospitals with only inpatient care and
outpatient visits. On the other hand, primary care activities and/or long-
term recovery seem to have diseconomies of scale with respect to inpatient
care as they tend to be performed by separate organizations.
As for the empirical measurement of economies of scale and scope, which
we review in subsection 6.1, this is usually done by considering the three
broad aggregates that we outlined above: total number of discharges, out-
patient visits and emergency room episodes. An alternative could be to
estimate economics of scale and/or scope by taking each DRG as a distinct
output. This could be quite a difficult task since, typically, a patient clas-
sification system may have more than 500 DRGs. In contrast, when our
interest lies in the detail within the hospital, then focusing at the DRG level
may be a fruitful way to go.5
Economies of scale and economies of scope are not a choice of the hospi-
tal. They are determined by medical knowledge and technology. However,
an important role exists for “management” choices on which resources to use
and how to combine them to achieve the desired outcome (activity level).
The choices made can be seen at the light of three concepts of efficiency.
First, a good decision process leads to technological efficiency, defined as a
situation where no waste of resources exists. That is, reducing the amount
of any of the inputs used results in not achieving the desired level of ac-
tivity. Different combinations of resources for a given objective may have
this characteristic of being efficient from a technological viewpoint. It now
5The recent work of Olsen and Street (2008) is a good example of this approach.
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comes the second layer of efficiency: from the technologically efficiency com-
binations of inputs, valuation of resources at their (opportunity) cost will
reveal which combination(s) have the minimum cost to achieve the desired
objective for hospital activity. The crucial element added in this step is the
set of input prices. The third, and final, step is the definition of the desired
level of activity (output). This implies defining the objective function of the
hospital: what is valued and which trade-offs are present. The definition of
the objective function of the hospital is addressed in more detail in the next
section.
Let us finally stress one of our main messages. The literature has failed to
fully tackle the main distinctive feature of a hospital relative to other health
care providers: the ability to treat acute illness in a way that accounts for
the uncertainty in the treatment process.
3 Preferences: what does a hospital want?
The previous section addressed the definition of hospital technology. The
next step is to define what the hospital wants to do. It implies defining the
objective function of the hospital, an issue intertwined with ownership. We
look first at utility-maximizing hospitals in a general way, and then at the
implications of different ownerships.
3.1 Models of hospital behavior
The objective function of the hospital can be defined in several different
ways and existing literature reflects those possibilities. Departures from
simple profit maximization have been justified in various manners, includ-
ing altruism in physician preferences (taking physicians to be the crucial
decision makers), reduced-form representation of interaction between hospi-
tal managers (who care about costs and revenues) and physicians (who care
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about benefits to patients), etc. Making explicit the objective function of
the hospital allows for determination of the optimal/desired output level.
A traditional discussion about choosing the “right” (desired) hospital
output is associated with the role of quality and the trade-off between lower
costs and higher quality. This trade-off is based on the assumption that
higher quality implies more costs. This is likely to be so in efficient hospitals.
However, inefficient hospitals may have room to improve simultaneously in
both dimensions.
Quality is also an issue when comparing public and private (for-profit)
ownership structures, with the usual presumption being that private hos-
pitals will degrade (non-observable) quality of care to save on costs. This
view, however, ignores the role that quality may have in attracting patients.
Whenever, due to health insurance arrangements (be it voluntary, manda-
tory, social or public insurance) patients become relative insensitive to price
but are still reacting to quality differences, then private (for profit) hospitals
will use quality as a competitive tool. Quality in for-profit hospitals may
then be higher than in public hospitals, namely in those dimensions that
influence more consumers’ decisions. Differences in objective functions are
not neutral to the desired level of activity for the hospital. Whenever a
trade-off between quality and quantity exists, different preferences generate
distinct outcomes.
The quantity-quality model of Newhouse (1970) focuses on the role of
hospital administrators. As Newhouse (1970) noted, even if the profit max-
imization objective is removed, the hospital still faces a tradeoff between
quantity and quality. Indeed, for a given budget, greater quantities of care
can only come at the expense of a decrease in quality of care, and viceversa.
We refer to this tradeoff as “the budget constraint.” He then proposes that
the hospital will pursue some balance between quality within this budget
constraint, and that this balance will be determined by the preferences of
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the ruling body of the hospital, to which we will refer simply as “the board”.
Phelps (2002) offers us an overview of the determinants of these preferences.
The basic idea is that a median voter exists in the board, that is, a voter
whose preferences are such that an equal number of board members are on
the “more quality and less quantity side” and on the “more quantity and
less quality” side. The median voter will win any vote over the choice within
the budget constraint.
A deeper question is where a particular composition of the board in
terms of these preferences comes from. Phelps propose that this depends on
some (exogenous) initial conditions (the rules of the game and perhaps the
preferences of donors), and on how new board members are elected (again
the rules of the game). If new board members are chosen by the board itself,
the composition of board preferences should show some stability.
Several other models of hospital behavior can be found in the litera-
ture. For example, Weisbrod (1988) describes non-profit hospitals, assum-
ing decision-makers that aim at both quality and quantity. They are not
fundamentally different from for-profit hospitals, as technological efficiency
and allocative efficiency are equally important to achieve.
A problem with these views is that any conflict of objectives between the
board and the many different groups that actually take the decisions within
the hospital (managers, clinicians, and so on) is assumed away. We now
describe the different attempts in the literature to address this important
issue.
3.2 The separation of governance and control
Pauly and Redisch (1973) are the first authors to offer us a different view of
the hospital. They assume that clinicians, who take many of the important
decisions, will disregard the objectives of the board and will maximize their
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own welfare.6 This is the view of the hospital as a “physicians cooperative”.
Inasmuch as physicians may be able to capture a proportion of the hospital’s
profits (receipts of all kinds minus operation costs), the two views may
seem truly antithetical. Indeed, the budget balance constraint assumed by
Newhouse is tantamount to a zero profit condition, while the physicians
cooperative will strive at maximizing profits. However, the advertent reader
will quickly realize that the two views in fact converge in their predictions
if (i) hospitals compete against each other and (ii) free entry is guaranteed
by the authorities. Indeed, long run competition among profit maximizing
hospitals (or among any for profit organization for that matter) will drive
profits down to zero. It is well known, however, that this conclusion breaks
down in industries where large economies of scale and scope are present,
and where entry is heavily regulated. Hospital care is one such industry.
Moreover, the time horizon for the usual decision maker in a hospital (not
to speak of emergency admissions) and that of the board could be very
different. In a nutshell, budget considerations are most surely ignored by a
clinician taking life and death decisions.
This debate is, in any case, enlightening. It casts doubt into the differ-
ence between profit maximizing and non profit organizations, and redirects
the attention from board politics to the separation between “ownership” (in
the sense of governance) and control in organizations. It also cast doubts
on whether it is relevant to perform the usual distinction between publicly
owned, independent non-profit organizations, and for-profit hospitals. To
put it bluntly, why should a physician who is paid on a fee per service basis
in a publicly owned hospital and a physician who is paid on the same basis
in a non-profit hospital behave any different? It then all boils down to the
6One direct way to perhaps reconcile the two views is to assume that the median voter
in the Board is a clinician. However, the classical view looks at choices within the budget
constraint, while Pauly and Redisch take a different view, where the quantity/quality pair
falls short of the budget and the difference is pocketed by the clinicians.
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choice of incentive structure and organizational design.
In light of this, one is faced with the difficulty of making sense of the
observed diversity with respect to ownership structure. Indeed, within and
across countries we often find coexistence of the following three ownership
structures: public, private for-profit and private not-for-profit, with distinct
shares in each case. For example, Belgium and the Netherlands have a
majority of private hospitals, France has mainly public hospitals (2/3 of
the total), Denmark and Sweden mainly public hospitals but owned locally,
while the UK has a majority of public hospitals owned by the National
Health Service. Germany has a slight majority (53%) of public hospitals,
but financing is done at the regional level and rules apply equally to all.
For-profit hospitals can be owned by corporations or by cooperatives (as-
sociations) of doctors. Not-for-profit hospitals may be owned by founda-
tions or by churches, for example. Public hospitals belong to Governments,
though in some countries this occurs at the city/county level while in others
hospitals are controlled by the central Government.
In any case, the central question is whether the performance of each of
these structures is any different. We will address this empirical question
in subsection 6.2. If there is a difference, is it due to differences in owner-
ship structure or to the way in which the diverging objectives (physicians’,
nurses’, managers’) are aligned though implicit and explicit contracts?
A further advance concerning the separation between ownership and
control within the hospital is that of Harris (1977). He introduces the idea
that we should see the hospital as a non-market way of organizing demand
and supply of a certain type of health care. On the demand side, we have
medical staff whose objective is to acquire the necessary resources to treat
patients. On the supply side, we have the administration who is in charge
of the management decisions, making sure that these resources are available
and also balancing them across the diverse internal demands within the
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hospital. Another important contribution from Harris (1977) is the explicit
recognition that a double hierarchy exists within the hospital, each one
associated to one side of the market. More importantly, he argues that
the equilibrium in this market is reached not by a price mechanism but
by negotiation. This original view has had only a partial impact on the
economic analysis of the hospital. We propose a possible explanation for
this below.
Once the market ceases to be the mechanism to allocate resources, one
needs to study what is the alternative procedure by which the actual play-
ers within the organization choose amongst the different options. In this
respect, economists have distinguished between two phases. The first phase
is the determination of the set of efficient alternatives. The second is the
choice of alternatives within this set. Notice that, by the first fundamental
theorem of welfare economics, both phases can be achieved, by price magic,
in a completely decentralized fashion. However, when the first fundamental
theorem is not applicable due to externalities, economies of scale and scope,
or asymmetric information then one needs to resort to contracts and negoti-
ation. In this sense, one could view Phelps’ approach to board politics as one
attempt to address this second phase of the analysis. However, notice that
the rules of the game in the day-to-day interaction among hospital staff are
much less clear than in the board. Defining such rules for each possible such
interaction becomes a difficult task, given the specificity of each patient’s
case. Hence, on the spot negotiation and a general lack of commitment will
dominate these interactions.
As for the first phase, the determination of optimal contracts in the hos-
pital, agency and team theory have made important contributions, which we
review in Section 4. On theory grounds, we identify there several attempts
to address the specific nature of the hospital as a decision making unit.
In contrast, the second phase – how and which allocation is chosen among
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the efficient – has received little attention. This is despite the fact that
there exist well-established tools in cooperative game theory and in its non-
cooperative underpinning (bargaining theory) that could in principle be ap-
plied. Why is it then that we seldom see this done? In our opinion, the
fundamental reason is the fact that certain aspects of the environment can
only be observed by one of the parties. For instance, consider a clinician ask-
ing a hospital administrator to purchase some high-tech piece of equipment.
The administrator may be more knowledgeable about the financial costs,
about whether this equipment is available in other hospitals in the area, or
about the true magnitude of its cost offsets; whereas the doctor may have
privileged information on the health benefits and diagnostic accuracy that
the equipment would bring in for each particular patient. Unobservable dif-
ferences in objectives (e.g., altruism, career concerns, and so on) among the
negotiating parties would play the same role. Such a situation is what Game
Theory refers to as an asymmetric information setting. Unfortunately, avail-
able theory (or we should say theories) provides very partial insights on how
such a manager and clinician would (or should be allowed to) arrive to a
decision. The reason is that current theories of bargaining under asymmet-
ric information are plagued by the curse of multiple equilibria. In other
words, even if one agrees that certain theory is the appropriate one, that
single theory is in may case unable to pin down a unique prediction. What
is worse, the particular set of equilibria that may be obtained depends on
the bargaining procedure itself (who starts making offers, the existence of
outside options, and so on).
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4 Incentives within the hospital
4.1 General elements
Before we enter the discussion of incentives, let us point out the three most
important factors that give rise to a (non-trivial) incentive problem in the
hospital context. The first factor is the existence of a conflict of objectives.
Here are some examples that will allow us to set some terminology. As
pointed out above, even if the (median voter of) the board may have decided
on a particular balance between quantity and quality, the agents actually
taking decisions may have conflicting objectives with that particular man-
date. The doctor may be more inclined to either save on her own diagnostic
effort or to improve the evidence about her skills by ordering extra tests,
or by overstaffing. Similarly, hospital managers may want to secure good
results by installing state of the art technical equipment that may be un-
needed given the existence of similar resources nearby. In this examples, the
board acts as “the principal” in the relationship, while we refer to doctors
and managers as “agents”. As another example, the institution that pays
for hospital care but does not enjoy it directly (be the government, an in-
surance company, or even a donor) may desire to contain costs more than
the board. In this case the board is the agent of the paying institution, who
acts now as the principal. These two examples point out that the actual
chain of command from the payer to the doctor is much longer than just a
two-tier principal-agent relationship. Hence, the hierarchy will have several
concatenated principal-agent relationships, where the agent of given pair is
the principal of the next. The payer is the principal vis-a´-vis the board and
the board is the principal vis-a´-vis the doctor. In fact, the actual structure
of the hierarchy constitutes an important subject of study as will be seen
below.
The second factor is the presence of asymmetric information. Asymmet-
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ric information may arise for two reasons. One is the impossibility that the
principal observe and scrutinize all the actions taken by its agents. Doctors
–and not the board– decide over admission, testing and treatment while
managers –and not the board– decide over equipment and resource inven-
tories. The other is the impossibility that the principal perfectly observe
the environment in which these actions were taken. For instance, the doc-
tor may have privileged information on the present health conditions of the
potential population of patients.
The third and final factor is the existence of risk. Risk blurs the link
between what it is observable by the principal and either the actions of the
agents or the environment. The health status of patient may worsen despite
the fact that the correct course of action was taken by the doctor in charge.
The average length of stay may increase because of reasons that lie beyond
the responsibility of the team in charge of the floor. Although procedures
exist to gain information about the agent’s actions or the environment, these
procedures will at most yield partial information. Examples of such proce-
dures are external and internal audits and reports or inquests filled in by
patients.
Such asymmetric information problems as well as how remuneration sys-
tems can palliate these problems, are issues treated elsewhere in this volume
(on Agency, see chapter 26; and on Provider Payment and Incentives, see
chapter 27). However, we will argue here that the hospital environment adds
new aspects to the usual single-principal/single-agent relationship. Most of
these aspects arise from our view of the hospital as a team (e.g., doctors and
nurses, hospital administrators and specialists). This view naturally leads to
issues like the availability of measures of each team member’s performance,
the convenience to provide group incentives, and hierarchical design (should
some decisions be delegated? who contracts with whom?).
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4.2 Group incentives
The first question that arises when looking at team performance and remu-
neration is with what accuracy can one observe each individual’s contribu-
tion. This depends on the particular measure of performance that one uses.
Take the example of a doctor and a nurse, an example that we will exploit
further below. If one assesses the performance of the nurse as simply the
amount of visits that the nurse makes to any given patient, then such perfor-
mance measure could be deemed to be the nurse’s individual responsibility.
In contrast, if one looks at the difference between the patient’s initial and
final health status, then this will be a complex function of the efforts of both
the doctor and the nurse. We will formalize this distinction below. Another
issue is whether the pay of these two agents should be based on such com-
plex signals, i.e., on whether each agent’s pay should be linked to the other’s
actions and decisions. One more example illustrates this point. Suppose, as
it is typicality in US hospitals, that the doctor is paid on a fee-for service
basis whereas the nurse is salaried.7 Even if the improvement in patient’s
health can be regarded as joint production, neither remuneration system is
taking into account the fact that such improvement is in fact the result of
the interaction between doctor and nurse. If instead one would reward these
professionals on the basis of some measure of health improvement, we would
indeed be observing team pay.
This example notwithstanding, it is true that team incentives are more
the exception than the rule in the real world. This is despite the fact that
paying individuals according to individual performance measures only may
lead to uncooperative behavior and inefficiencies. To better understand
where and when these inefficiencies arise, we provide a more formal analysis
of this issue.
7In US hospitals, medical staff holds a loose contactual relationship with the hospital
while nurses are hospital employees.
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The theory of team incentives has dealt with two different frameworks.
Whether we are in one or the other framework depends on whether indi-
vidual signals carrying information on each and all parties’ decisions are
available or not. The simplest example of each in the context of a hospital
would be the following. Suppose that one keeps track of most of the actions
that a nurse and a physician have taken when treating an inpatient. This
information would include number of bedside visits, medication dispensed,
or even questionnaires filled in by the patient on his appraisal of the per-
formance of each. We then would be in a context of individualized signals.
Consider now a situation in which we know only the number of days before
the patient is discharged, or his or her condition at the time of discharge.
We then have a single signal that is the result of the interaction of nurse
and physician.8
The issues involved in each of these two frameworks are very different.
In the first framework one wonders whether the contract of one agent should
be based not only on his own signal but also on the other agent’s signal as
well. In the second framework one is concerned about free riding. Notice
also that whether we are in one or the other framework is not exogenous,
as one can design protocols, monitoring and auditing, or even adjust the
physical location of each player, in order to better distinguish one player’s
contribution from the other’s.
As for the individualized signal’s framework, the main insight is offered
by Holmstrom (1982). It is only in very special circumstances that the
third-party payer should not make one team member’s contract depend
on the other’s performance. In fact, the needed mathematical property is
somewhat obscure.9 It includes, though, an intuitive case: the situation
8For an empirical analysys of the effects of financial rewards on team incentives in the
collection of indirect tax in the UK, see Burgess et al. duggna (2007).
9The property is that team member A’s signal (say signal a) be a sufficient statistic
for team member B’s signal (say signal b) when one is trying to infer A’s actions. In that
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where team members performances (signals) are completely independent.
Notice, however, that such a restrictive assumption leads to an extremely
degenerate case of a “team”. It is very likely that useful indicators of a
nurse’s performance will indeed depend on the actions taken by the team’s
doctor. Take as a rather extreme example, the number of visits by the nurse
will increase as a consequence of a shirking doctor.
In the absence of any informational asymmetries amongst team members
and the third-party payer, the previous discussion implies that it is optimal
to centralize contracts. We return to this issue in the last subsection. To sum
up, we should see team incentives that are based on every team member’s
performance.
A second contribution of Holmstrom (1982) is to formalize the very intu-
itive but often forgotten idea that one should not punish a team member for
some other member’s inappropriate action. This is not a fairness issue only.
Take the example of a team composed of an oncologist, who chooses her di-
agnostic effort, and a manager, who decides upon the quality of a computed
tomography scanner to be installed. Suppose that if the manager installs a
very low quality CT scanner, the performance measure of the doctor (say,
length of stay) becomes independent of the doctor’s diagnostic effort. Then
the contract of the doctor should not depend on the length of stay. Suppose
on the contrary that, if the manager has installed a high quality scanner,
then the length of stay becomes a good signal of doctor’s effort.10 In other
words, the probability of a long length of stay diminishes when the doctor
exerts the needed level of care. In that case the doctor’s contract should
indeed depend on the length of stay.
case, A’s contract is independent of B’s signal. One says that a is a sufficient statistic for
b if one can express the joint distribution of a and b as a product of two functions, one
that depends only on a and b, and one that depends only on a and on A’s actions.
10We are assuming that the advantages of that signal together with the improved efficacy
of the scanner more than compensate the higher cost of the better quality scanner.
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To sum up, it should be the case that the incentives contained in the
doctor’s contract depend on the manager’s performance. The doctor’s pay
should depend heavily on the length of stay when there is indication that
the manager performed well, whereas it should not depend on the length of
stay otherwise. This not only provides the right incentives to the doctor, but
also leads to the right risk-sharing between manager and doctor. Nothing
in this discussion relates to fairness.
Admittedly, this points toward a quite sophisticated system of incentives.
Indeed, it is also perhaps the case that one cannot directly observe the
manager’s actions and one needs to look at, say, running costs as a proxy for
these actions. But these running costs surely depend on doctors’ actions,
and so on. Failure to recognize these interdependencies would lead to an
incentive system that does not promote the right decisions, makes team
members bear unnecessary compensation risks, and may even undermine
overall morale.
As a caveat for the reader, one should not think only of monetary in-
centives. It has been shown that non-pecuniary rewards are as important:
improved facilities and amenities, promotion, recognition by the other mem-
bers of the team, and so on are good examples.11 In general, the literature
has converted these incentives into money equivalents, a simplification that
is not free of criticism. It has been argued that psychological and behavioral
factors like team morale or altruism could be undermined when financial
incentives come in.12
Let us turn to the single team signal framework. Although there are
ways to organize a hospital so that individual accountability to the board is
11Ratto et al. (2001) discuss how non-pecuaniary rewards may foster team incentives
in the context of the National Health System in the UK.
12As Seabright (2002) poses it, “civic virtue may, on this view, be crowded out by the
introduction of explicit incentives.” See this work for a way to endogenize this result by
means of a standard screening model under asymmetric information.
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possible, there are some instances where it is just impossible to disentangle
each team members’ performance. Take for instance emergency admissions,
where there is just no time to produce individual indicators. Perhaps only
extremely imperfect indicators can be obtained ex-post. Then, the only sig-
nal available is the health condition of the patient in subsequent periods.
How should the team members’ performance be influenced? As mentioned
above, it is the free-rider problem that is central in this context. The gen-
eral literature has produced quite a negative result here: there exists no
mechanism that solves the free-riding problem, unless some outside party
“breaks the budget.” In other words, if the team enjoys the net benefit of
the relationship and shares it among its members, there does not exist a
sharing rule that provides the right incentives. The idea is the following. In
order to motivate each member of the team, it is necessary that, in case of
underperformance, some group penalty be levied. This group penalty then
implies a reduction in whatever net revenue has been accomplished. This in
turn will decrease the shares of the net revenue enjoyed by each of the team
members. Provided that the group penalty is sufficiently harsh, individu-
als will behave. This mitigates the free rider problem that originates when
the full net benefit is to be shared. Take for example a health authority
that provides incentives to a hospital by allocating extra funds. This health
authority acts as the outside party that breaks the budget balance. If the
hospital performs under some standard, it will not enjoy that extra fund.
More importantly, the health authority keeps the undistributed funds. This
serves as a commitment device. It is easy to see why it is difficult to sus-
tain threats of group penalties that would be purely wasteful in the absence
of such a third party. Once team performance is low, the team members
have all the incentives to renegotiate the contract. Why self-inflict a wasteful
punishment? However, if team members foresee such a renegotiation before
deciding what to do, the free-rider problem reappears –full force.
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The main lesson that springs from the previous discussion is that one
should ensure that no such renegotiation is possible. Namely, one should
keep distance between the payer (whoever bears the performance bonuses,
be it the hospital manager, the insurer, or the Board of Trustees), and the
team members. Put more bluntly, the payer should not be one more team
member. He or she should benefit from any reduction in pay that is levied
on the underperforming team.
Another possibility would be to introduce competition between teams.
This would be tantamount of having the winning team collecting the bonus.
Some experiments in this area have been performed, but never within the
hospital, where each team provides such a different service from the other
that any comparison becomes impossible. In other words, competition could
be beneficial only if teams are whole hospitals that compete in providing a
similar set of services to similar populations.
Doctors and nurses
One of the issues addressed in Chapter 22 is that of the shifting of
skills between professions. Tavares (2005) analyses the particular case of
the shift of responsibilities from doctors to nurses. Her main insight is
that such a shift may in fact require a larger overall budget for incentive
compensation. This author uses a model of the doctor-nurse team in which
there is a single, overall indicator (patient is either cured or requires new
treatment). The main intuition is that free-riding incentives on the part
of doctors are reinforced if nurses’ effort becomes more productive. She
uses this model to discuss how failure by the health authorities to recognize
this effect can lead to equilibrium actions within the team that not only
harm overall welfare, but also may lead to resentment on the part of nurses.
Therefore, she can also use this model to explain both the demand by doctors
for higher pay and the demand by nurses of a recognition of their change in
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status.
Centralization versus decentralization and the provision of incentives
When we consider the hospital as a cascade of contracts we are already
assuming a special hierarchical form. Indeed, one could imagine a hospi-
tal where all contracting is centralized, so that a single decision maker –
possibly the third-party payer – chooses the contracts of all team mem-
bers. Abstracting from communication costs, several authors have studied
the advantages of delegated contracting. Jelovac and Macho-Stadler (2002)
propose a model of a hospital where two agents, let us refer to them as
a manager and a doctor, decide on separate production inputs. Let us
say that the first input is investment in equipment and the second one is
diagnostic effort. These authors illustrate a subtle idea: when two agents
interact, the contract for one of the agents can also be used to discipline the
other. With this in mind, assume that the third-party payer can observe
neither the manager’s investment nor the doctor’s effort. Consequently, an
important piece of information is lost when all contracting is in the hands of
the third-party payer. More specifically, the third-party payer cannot make
the contract for the doctor contingent on the manager’s investment decision,
because the third-party payer cannot observe this decision. Hence, that con-
tract, which could be used to govern the manager, loses this functionality.
In contrast, if we allow the manager to design the doctor’s contract, this
specific function of the doctor’s contract is restored. Of course, delegat-
ing contracting also has a disadvantage. The manager can manipulate the
doctor’s contract to his own benefit. When is it then that decentralization
fares better from the third-party payer’s point of view? Take the case when
investment and diagnostic effort are complements of production. Then de-
centralizing is better, since the manager can, by providing incentives to the
doctor, enhance his own incentives. Therefore, it all depends on the degree
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of complementarity. For instance, it could be argued that, for treatments
that are not high-tech, the doctor’s productivity is quite independent of the
hospital equipment. Centralization would be the better choice there.
Admittedly, and despite the theoretical appeal of the proceeding discus-
sion, it not easy to find real world instances where these issues have been
pondered in the context of hospital organization. In contrast, they have
originated much debate in the managerial science literature.
Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1998) study the delegation of con-
tract design in the presence of collusion amongst team members. Although
their analysis is very general, their insights can be readily applied to hospi-
tal management. Take the same example as before. If the third-party payer
delegates to the manager the contracting of a specialist, this is equivalent
to the third-party payer centralizing all contracts and then the manager
and the specialist colluding in their decisions. Formally, if the third-party
payer is to find the optimal coalition-proof set of contracts, this is equivalent
to finding the best manager’s contract from the point of view of the payer
whilst taking into account that the manager will behave opportunistically
when providing incentives to the doctor.
This has important implications for the organization of a hospital. Sup-
pose that, in the absence of coalition formation, it was better to centralize
contracts. Then, the policy of separating management and medical decisions
(the double hierarchy, as seen by Harris, 1977) is indeed beneficial if such
separation limits the extent to which managers and doctors can collude.
Finally, Boadway et al. (2004) also recognize the distinctive role that
managers and doctors play in the hospital. The main issue addressed is the
asymmetry of information: doctors have better information about patient
needs (high versus low tech treatments and equipment) than hospital man-
agers do. Managers, in turn, have better information on case mix than the
payer (which is taken here to be a public authority, like the NHS). They
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show that a cascade of contracts should be aimed at eliciting the private
information of these agents at the least cost. The main implication is that
high-tech equipment and high tech services are over-promoted in comparison
to a situation where information is symmetric.
5 The hospital and the outside world
5.1 Contracting with payers
Recent decades have witnessed important changes in the way hospitals re-
late with payers of health care. The managed care trend, initiated in the
early 1970s in the United States, and the movement toward activity based
payments in many other countries have changed the way hospitals are fi-
nanced (see chapter 27 in this volume for a discussion of provider payment
rules). We take here a different view, looking at other issues, like the ex-
istence of multiple payers and the (potential) role of economies of scale in
their presence.
The creation of DRGs has made possible the use of more sophisticated
payment schedules. From simply invoicing payers for the health care pro-
vided, many hospitals around the world now have to negotiate in advance
how payments will be made and how much it will receive for each type of
care.
Third-party payers, be they commercial health insurance companies,
sickness funds or national health services, faced with ever-increasing health
costs look at ways to induce more efficient health care delivery. Over time,
payment rules to hospitals became a tool to third-party payers to influence
hospital behavior, not just a mere transfer of funds. It is worth pointing out
the most important transformation that took place: payment mechanisms
are now seen as a way to influence indirectly hospitals’ organization. From
a traditional cost reimbursement system, in which hospitals invoiced their
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costs to third-party payers, payment mechanisms evolved to prospective pay-
ment, with prices set for treatment episodes. This change resulted from the
recognition that cost reimbursement gives too little incentives for efficiency.
Moving to prospective payments, characterized by more aggregate units of
care provided (treatment episode, for example) leads to stronger incentives
for efficiency. The downside of this change is that is also creates incentives
for risk selection and for misclassification of patients.
The change in payment rules, and the existence of asymmetric informa-
tion between payers and hospitals, opens the door for hospitals to “game”
against payment schedules. The traditional, simple, relationship of cost in-
voicing of cost reimbursement has been replaced. The new relationships
have now to balance two different objectives: provide incentives for effi-
ciency of health care delivery within the hospital and avoid incentives for
cream-skimming (risk selection) by hospitals. The basic trade-off that needs
to be solved in the definition of payment schedules to hospitals has given
rise to an extensive literature, which is reviewed in chapter 27.
Some related issues are less well understood: the role of economies of
scale (and scope), and the role of large third-party payers, both of which are
associated with an often neglected feature – hospitals can be funded by more
than one payer. This is generally true in health systems where a multiplicity
of health insurers coexist. Also in countries where a national health service
is the preferred mode of health insurance, it is often the case that voluntary
health insurance covering hospital care is present.
The existence of multiple payers leads to new issues in the definition of
payment schedules, especially if one of the payers is significantly larger than
the others. These large payers negotiate with hospitals, and are usually able
to obtain different prices. Volume typically gains lower prices to the payer.
Suppose a hospital is already operating at a volume range where disec-
onomies of scale exist, after contracting an activity level with a third-party
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payer. Then, another third-party payer wishes to contract with the hospital.
The basic question is: how should the price be set?
In this simple sequential description, the price set for the second, smaller,
third-party payer must reflect its impact on costs, and therefore, will exceed
the average cost (per patient treated). If there are diseconomies of scale,
the incremental average cost of extra patients treated will be higher than
the average costs in the main contractual relationship. Under economies of
scale, the reverse possibility occurs: the marginal third-party payer benefits
from dilution of fixed costs, and the incremental average cost will be less.
Therefore, for a constant batch of potential patients that it brings to the
hospital, the exact payment schedule that the hospital is willing to accept
can be quite different according to whether economies, or diseconomies, of
scale prevail.
A related question is whether in the presence of a strong component
of fixed costs, should the smaller third-party payers contribute to cover the
fixed cost? How should this contribution be set? For example, one may think
that smaller third-party payers should pay only the incremental cost that
the care provided to their beneficiaries creates. Another approach would
be to set a payment by each third-party payer equal to the average cost.
The difference between the two alternatives may be significant. Firstly, in
the presence of diseconomies of scale, having the smaller third-party payer
paying according to the average cost shifts some cost to the larger payer.
Secondly, in a more subtle way and following from the first effect, third-party
payers may offer a more generous coverage to their beneficiaries and induce
higher use of hospital services. Both effects suggest that marginal third-
party payers should pay more than the average cost, though the question of
how to determine the identity of the marginal payer is not easy to answer.
Another (disputed) effect in the relationship of the hospital with large
payers is the cost shifting behavior. Cost shifting has been defined as the
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practice of hospitals increasing prices to one group of third-party payers
following price decrease associated with payments from another group en-
forced by some large payer, typically large Government-based programmes
(like Medicare or Medicaid, in the US). The existence of cost-shifting be-
havior naturally requires the ability of the hospital to set prices for the care
it provides. An initial explanation for cost shifting behavior required mar-
ket power of hospitals and that prior to a change in prices paid by large
payers such market power was not fully exploited by the hospital (although
no rational is presented why market power was not exercised to full extent
before, and why that changes). Morrisey (2003) addresses the issue from the
perspective of market power as the cause of cost-shifting, to dismiss it as a
relevant issue.13 When faced with a price decrease forced by a large payer,
hospitals face an alternative course of action, rather than cost shift: to look
for savings resulting from economies of scale and/or from economies of scope,
and to reduce inefficiencies.14 Morrisey’s looks at the role of non-profit orga-
nizations (and provision of charitable care) as the reason why market power
is not fully exploited in the first place, just to discard it. Under Morrisey’s
argument, having other objectives than pure profit maximization does not
imply that payers do not negotiate to obtain the lowest price possible from
providers. Providers also have an advantage in diversifying payers, to avoid
becoming dependent on a single one. Improvement in the mix of patients
from different payers can also be attempted by providers, namely through
carefully crafting services offered. Thus, other strategies available to hospi-
tals are superior to cost-shifting. For public policy action, Morrisey (2003)
proposes measures that increase market competition.
On the empirical side of cost-shifting behavior, most works find small
effects of cost-shifting, and not particular pattern emerges. In some cases
13See Morrisey (1994) for an earlier view on the issue.
14Note that prospective payment mechanisms aim at reducing inefficiencies as well.
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for-profit hospitals do not engage in cost-shifting, while for-profit do. In
other cases, both type of hospitals do cost-shifting.15 Cost shifting across
different services is only possible if they are paid for by distinct third-party
payers. More recently, Santerre (2005) performs an empirical analysis of
cost shifting behavior, finding only a very minor efficiency loss, less than 1%
of total private hospital expenditures (for 1992, US data). This corroborates
an earlier discussion by Ginsburg (2003), who highlights that welfare costs
are associated with distortions with inelastic demands tend to be small.
Only distribution issues remain.
A related problem is addressed in Ma and McGuire (1993), where the
way to pay for fixed costs (joint costs, in their terminology) by third-party
payers is discussed.16 Their analysis takes into account that the level of fixed
costs is endogenous with payment structures in the case of hospitals. The
way the payment rules are set will determine the incentives for investment
and technology adoption.17
In this context, the possibility of a reimbursement transfer to pay for the
fixed cost (called pass-through in Ma and McGuire’s (1993) discussion) may
improve overall efficiency. In particular, if one of the third-party payers has
the opportunity to use cost reimbursement and commit first to its payment
schedule, it may use the payment system strategically. By defining first its
payment rule, it forces the other providers to cover the remaining costs of
the provider. In doing so, it also increases aggregate social welfare, although
some fixed cost share is shifted from the largest to the smallest third-party
payer.
In their paper, Ma and McGuire (1993) identify the larger third-party
15See Clement (1999), Dranove (1988), Duggan (2002), Friesner and Rosenman (2004),
Hadley and Feder (1985), Rosenman and Friesner (2002), Zwanziger et al. (2000).
16Further discussion of hospital decisions in the presence of cost shifting is done in
Glazer and McGuire (1994).
17Typically, payers refrain from paying innovation and tend to shift the innovation
adoption risk to providers.
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payer with a public payer, the federal Medicare programme. Their most
interesting result is that an efficiency allocation of resources (investment
decisions) is achieved in equilibrium if and only if the large payer moves first
and commits to a reimbursement level of the joint costs. This commitment
mitigates the incentive the large payer has to shift costs to small payers
(through the different prices the hospital has to charge each payer).
There are, of course, other reasons for differential treatment of third-
party providers, namely variation in bargaining power, which may be linked
to the size of demand each third-party payer brings to the hospital.18
The great majority of discussions about payment schedules to hospitals
implicitly assume a single third-party payer or identical third-party payers.
We argue here that variation in third-party payer size, in terms of patients
they bring to the hospital, can easily lead to different payment schedules,
with non-trivial impact on the design of such payment schedules. Elements
such as the degree of economies of scale, interaction amongst third-party
payers mediated by the need to finance the hospital and bargaining positions
will create variation in payment schedules across third-party payers.
This is potentially relevant for all health systems, irrespective of their
funding organization being based on tax-funded national health services,
sickness funds or private health insurance. Further research is needed to
fully detail how these considerations are to be incorporated into activity-
based payment rules and other contractual approaches using DRGs as the
basic unit of payment.
5.2 Referrals
Typically, the analysis of hospitals starts with patients showing up at the
door of the hospital, and not much is said about demand for hospital services.
18For a summary of questions related to bargaining between hospitals and third-party
payers, see Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2006) and the references therein.
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Either it is assumed to be randomly determined from the point of view of
the hospital or that demand for hospital services is determined by quality
of care and prices, both time and monetary ones (including here the prices
resulting from agreements between third-party payers and the hospital).
Future demand is discussed usually with reference to waiting lists for
surgery, which nonetheless result from hospital decisions. This common
approach neglects the role of the interactions between the hospital and other
health care providers that may refer patients for hospital treatment.
In this respect, a common observation one hears from hospital managers,
specialists, and policymakers is that a large fraction of cases they see could
have been resolved in primary care.19 This issue is closely related with the
discussion on payment structures. Whenever hospitals are funded by case
payments they prefer to receive more patients for treatment while hospitals
funded by capitation (to treat people in a defined catchment area) will in-
vest more in keeping patients treated at primary care level when clinically
feasible. In other words, these professionals are demanding a larger role of
primary care in gatekeeping. In fact, several health systems make referral
by a GP a necessary condition to visit a specialist. This is indeed the case
in Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In con-
trast, the gatekeeping role of the GP is very limited in Belgium, Finland,
France and Germany. The issue of whether referral by a GP should be made
compulsory or not has deserved quite a lot of attention recently. Gatekeep-
ing determines to a considerable extent the demand faced by the hospital.
Moreover, referrals to the hospital depend on both the incentives faced by
GPs and on the formal relationship between primary care and hospitals.20
This is true not only for a national health system where hospitals are
19This concern was already voiced in the survey by Scott (2000), who mentioned the
large differences observed in referral rates across GPs. See also Malcomson (2004).
20For the reader interested in the issue, see, for example, Brekke et al. (2007), Garcia-
Marinoso and Jelovac (2003), and Gonzalez (2006).
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public but also for managed care institutions. The later also tend to value
primary care as a screening device before people get admitted for hospital
treatment. Therefore, the scarcity of literature regarding how this relation-
ship is established and what its implications are is surprising. For example,
in national health services, primary care centers are run separately from
hospitals, while in health maintenance organizations a more integrated view
of hospital care and primary care exists.
In many circumstances, referral decisions are the only connection and
entail no financial transfer. The fund-holding GP’s experience in the UK
introduced a financial element into this relationship (GPs that were fund
holders had to pay for the care to their patients out of the budget they
received). Whenever no money is involved, we often see calls for cooperation
between physicians at the hospital and at the primary care centre. At the
other extreme, we see managed care institutions vertically integrating the
role of GPs in terms of referral to hospital care.
Some interesting questions arise in this relationship, since the decision
to refer a patient to hospital treatment, and thus to create the hospital’s
demand, lies in the hands of the GP at primary care institutions. The
relationship that is established between them will influence the referral flows
and the overall efficiency of the health system.21
From the point of view of the hospital, a closer relationship with primary
care may be more or less valued according to the way its financing is set.
The more aggregated way of paying a hospital with a well defined catch-
ment area, namely within a national health service, is to pay by capitation
– a fixed amount per year per member of the population in the relevant
geographic area.22
21For further discussion on this, see Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2003) for a theoretical
approach and Kripalani et al. (2007) for a review of existing literature on the relationship
between primary care and hospitals.
22Of course, capitation payments can also be defined with reference to groups formed
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Under this capitation system, the hospital has a clear incentive to detect
health problems early and to treat patients at primary care facilities when-
ever feasible. On the other hand, if the hospital is paid mainly on the basis
of how many patients it treats, it has the opposite incentive.
The balance between improving internal efficiency and improving referral
decisions from primary care is clearly different to the hospital according to
the way it is paid. Recent empirical research provides some information on
the relevance of these mechanisms. Dusheiko et al. (2006) find that fund-
holding in the UK reduced referral to elective surgery. Thus, an integrated
view of hospital and primary care incentives may prove useful to better
understand how the demand for the hospital is actually determined. Still,
further work on the issue is welcome.23
6 Some empirical evidence
6.1 Technology
Since data on hospitals is often routinely collected, it is of no surprise that
many studies related to scale and scope economies in hospitals have been
produced, as well as studies addressing productive efficiency, using several
statistical techniques (the most popular ones being stochastic frontier anal-
ysis and DEA - Data Envelopment Analysis).24
Typically, concern with economies of scale (and/or scope) arises from
the search for the most efficient scale for a hospital to operate at.
Knowledge about economies of scale and economies of scope is impor-
tant to define the size of new hospitals, and range of services offered, when
the hospital care is delivered directly by the Government (as in the case
in different ways, say, the beneficiaries of a given sickness fund or health insurer.
23Windmeijer et al. (2005) have one of the few studies that address the relationship
between hospitals and general practice, though they do not address the role of referral.
24See Chapter 27 in this volume for a more in-depth review of efficiency studies. See
also the general reviews in Hollingsworth (2003) and Jacobs et al. (2006).
35
in countries where a national health service exists) and to assess hospital
mergers, in countries where hospital provision is mainly private. The litera-
ture on hospital cost structures attempts to define the optimal hospital size,
with most estimates putting it in the range 200-300 beds. The discussion of
the optimal size and scope of hospitals has somewhat faded away in recent
years.
From the recent studies, Preyra and Pink (2006) estimate a short-run
cost function and extend from it to the long-term cost function, finding an
optimal value of about 180 beds, using data from Ontario, for the period
1994/1996. This estimate is lower than previous conventional wisdom sug-
gested, though it is in line with a general trend toward shorter hospitalization
spells, which require fewer beds.25
One of the main issues in measuring economies of scale (productivity, in
general) in hospitals is the role of quality. More efficient hospitals are more
likely to have a lower marginal cost of providing quality, and accordingly
they may supply a higher quality level in equilibrium (which is likely to
raise costs and mask their efficiency advantage).
The way we look at the quantity-efficiency trade-off pointed out earlier
needs to be reformulated in the presence of inefficiency. An inefficient hos-
pital may actually improve on both dimensions, quality and quantity, when
it moves closer to the efficiency frontier.
The question of how the efficient scale and the degree of economies of
scope change with quality has not been addressed in recent literature. The
explicit consideration of quality choice by the hospital has other implications
as well, since the competitive environment of the hospital will affect such
choices.
On the issue of quality, the recent review by Gaynor (2006) makes clear
25For other recent evidence, see, among others, Dranove and Lindrooth (2003), Gaynor
and Vogt (2003), Ho and Hamilton (2002), Ray (2003).
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the ambiguities resulting from theory and concludes for the existence of
mixed evidence. The regularities identified by Gaynor (2006) allow a dis-
tinction according to whether a regulated price regime or a free price regime
prevails. In the first case, covering basically studies involving the US Medi-
care system, more competition seems to be associated with higher quality.
In contrast, when considering privately insured patients and prices set by
hospitals, no relationship between competition and quality exists. Both
findings are in line with economic theory.
Under regulated prices, quality is the main “competitive tool” of hospi-
tals and it is used intensively. Whenever both price and quality are available
instruments to the hospital, the effort to attract patients is spread over both
of them.26 More competition may then be associated with either higher or
lower quality, also depending on the intensity to which the hospital uses the
price in its policy. Since the marginal gain from using price or quality to
attract patients is also determined by the cost structure, not only is com-
petition in the marketplace relevant, but also cost structures. Economies of
scale will favour the use of the price vis-a´-vis quality, for example.
In more recent research, the discussion on economies of scale has been set
aside. Most empirical studies about hospital cost functions concentrate on
efficiency measurement, in particular technological efficiency. They seldom
report information on the optimal efficient scale of hospitals.
The issue of scale is being recovered somewhat at a different level. Given
the increasing availability of micro data, exploration of scale effects becomes
possible. An example is provided by Gaynor et al. (2005), who, in a simple
but effective way distinguish between economies of scale and learning by
doing as motives for a better performance (meaning a lower rate for in-
hospital mortality). There is a growing literature on the link between higher
26This is true also when patients have insurance coverage, as most health insurers ne-
gotiate prices with providers.
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volume and higher quality for many surgical procedures.
Scale also brings bargaining power gains. Burgess et al. (2005) and
Melnick and Keeler (2007) find that a group of hospitals is in a position to
charge higher prices. Since location of care provided is not a main force,
it is bargaining power that is driving the results. Thus, scale brings gains,
compared to single units, though related to prices rather than technological
opportunities. These gains are not social gains as prices just distribute
surplus between agents.
A final area where scale does matter is teaching. Several empirical works
have addressed the extra costs of teaching activities, usually by inclusion of
a dummy variable for teaching hospital status (capturing different levels in
costs in teaching hospitals, compared to non-teaching ones) or by separating
samples according to teaching/non-teaching status. This is hardly satisfac-
tory, as it ignores how teaching activities impact the cost function. Several
studies found higher costs for teaching hospitals.27 Teaching increases costs
because it diverts effort from doctors and leads to use of more resources, but
it can also reduce costs because medical students can be a cheaper substi-
tute for some medical labour work. A better understanding of how teaching
hospitals operate should be sought in future research agendas.
The issue of random demand and its impact on hospital costs has received
attention in several works.28 More recently, Sharma et al. (2008) show that
response to an unexpected demand surge for hospital services is more likely
to be met by early discharges to free up capacity than to ration admissions.
27See, among others, Linna (1998), Grosskopf et al. (2001), Rosko (2001, 2004), Farsi
and Filippini (2007).
28See Gaynor and Anderson (1995), Keeler and Ying (1996), Carey (1998) and Baker
et al (2004).
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6.2 Does ownership matter?
Most of the debate about ownership has been centred on empirical analy-
sis of performance differences, namely cost efficiency. The main empirical
hypothesis tested is based on the idea that as not-for-profit hospitals have
a less well defined residual claimant,29 we should expect them to be less
efficient, although related problems are that for-profit hospitals may more
easily induce demand and charge higher prices. Differences in several per-
formance indicators have been addressed: financial results, quality variables
and “upcoding” behavior. By “upcoding” we have in mind that one way
for hospitals to play against the payment system is to code patients in a
payment category higher than the correct one (in order to obtain a higher
transfer from the third-party payer).
The legal distinctions associated with each ownership form are reviewed
in Sloan (2000) and will not be repeated here. The early evidence points
to no systematic difference in either cost efficiency or quality levels between
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, though most literature on the issue is
related to US experience. The ambiguity resulting from earlier studies has
not been solved by recent works.
Several explanations have been advanced to explain the inconclusive
comparisons across ownership forms, namely measurement issues (especially
the questions associated with the appropriate definition of cost of capital in
not-for-profit hospitals) and the hypothesis that market discipline is not
strong enough to make for-profit hospitals sufficiently different from not-
for-profit hospitals.
The ownership of a hospital is an issue only if it implies different ob-
jective functions or different constraints on behavior. With regard to the
latter, it is often the case that not-for-profit organizations typically have
29On this see Section 4 on the consequences of the absence of a residual claimant.
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constraints on how to distribute accounting surpluses. In particular, any
surplus generated cannot be used to pay dividends, and it should, according
to common provision in statutes, be re-invested in the activity (or in a closely
related one). Surpluses may also be distributed to stakeholders (managers,
employees, physicians, etc.), though usually not openly discussed as such.
The differences in objective functions may result from choice of boards.
Whilst in for-profit institutions, shareholders select who runs the hospital, in
not-for-profit institutions other means must be found, and self-perpetuation
is easily achieved by entrenched directors. Moreover, exerting accountability
is more difficult, presumably opening more room for managerial discretion.
To control it, to some extent at least, compensation plans (involving stock
options and bonuses) to executives in not-for-profit institutions are usually
ruled out.
Distinct methodological approaches have been followed to make the com-
parisons, with unclear implications of the ambiguous results. Whether
paired comparisons, regression analysis or stochastic frontier estimation is
used, there is no clear supremacy of one ownership form over the other.
Shen et al. (2005) conduct a meta-analysis for US hospitals (since 1990),
finding that there are only minor differences between for-profit and not-for-
profit hospitals.30 Moreover, their analysis indicates that differences found
in previous studies were attributed to methodological issues, such as func-
tional forms, model specifications and definition of dependent variables in
the empirical application.31
The debate about ownership has been less intense outside the US, al-
though evidence has been gathered over the years in other countries. The
30See also Wong et al. (2005).
31See also, among others, Cremieux et al. (2005), Dafny (2005), Duggan (2000), Eggle-
ston et al. (2008), Leone and van Horne (2005), Lindrooth and Weisbrod (2007), Picone
et al. (2002), Rosenau and Linder (2003), Rosko (2001), Silverman and Skinner (2001),
and Wright (2007).
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focus has moved to management practice, with separation of ownership on
the one side, and management rules on the other side. This is especially
visible in countries with national health services that own and operate hos-
pitals. Introduction of different governance and management rules, namely
the use of trust or foundation status, is seen as a way to improve man-
agement efficiency without touching the usually delicate issue (at least, on
political grounds) of ownership. Again, no strong differences in performance
seem to be associated with ownership status.32
Sloan (2000) sets a research agenda about unsolved ownership issues:
the role of other outputs associated with ownership (such as local control
of the hospital), the need to have evidence from other countries, to look
on differences other than performance (cost efficiency) alone, deeper knowl-
edge of quality differences, better understanding of what constraints exist
in each case, and how patient choice may affect the definition of ownership
form. Except for more evidence from outside the US, little progress has
been made in the other topics. The ambiguities regarding the comparison
over ownership forms are still far from settled.
7 Discussion and challenges for future research
For a long time, economic analysis treated hospitals differently in theory
and in empirical applications. In the former, issues of physician agency,
contracting of hospital services and team production have been at the heart
of many studies. In contrast, empirical studies have treated the hospital as
a black box, addressing mostly issues about efficiency and implications of
different ownership forms (Government-owned, private for-profit and private
not-for-profit). Bridging the gap of theory to empirical work is a major chal-
lenge for current empirical research. A potential line of future developments
32See Marini et al. (2008) on the UK, Herr (2008) on Germany, Milcent (2005) on
France, Barbetta et al. (2007) on Italy.
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is to explore the empirical implications stemming from new theories on the
internal organization of the hospital.
Even at a theoretical level, there are still many open questions. Many
of them await the development of new tools. As mentioned in previous
sections, a major shortcoming of present analyses is that the negotiation
process that leads to the allocation of risk and expected surplus amongst the
parties within the hospital has been overlooked. One advantage of focusing
on hospitals in addressing this issue will be that technological aspects of the
medical decision will constrain the set of possible bargaining procedures.
As mentioned at the outset, Harris (1977) pointed out that medical care
at the hospital has some peculiarities, urgency and specificity, that require
a tailored decision-making process marked by a mixture of protocols and
needed improvisation. Perhaps these peculiarities will guide the theorist in
the specification of the “right” bargaining process.
Although it is true that the literature has studied the negotiation of
the hospital with the third-party payer, the issue of how to incorporate
economies of scale and scope (an therefore size), as well as the different
objectives that ownership structure implies into these negotiations, has only
recently received attention. Ownership issues alone, as envisaged by Sloan’s
(2000) agenda, present many opportunities for fruitful future research.
Still at the theoretical level, a thorough analysis of behavioral rather
than fully rational and selfish decision making is needed. Issues of altruism
have only recently been introduced in the neoclassical paradigm of selfish
utility maximization.33
Finally, many studies have addressed the issue of hospital efficiency. Typ-
ically, efficiency scores are estimated and sometimes researchers attempt to
find regularities between high efficiency scores and hospital characteristics.
33Biglaiser and Ma (forthcoming) and Ma and Rochet (2007) are examples of how one
could integrate negotiation and altruism in the classical incentive model.
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However, the internal organization of the hospital is not a common variable
of interest, most likely due to obvious measurement problems. This may
hinder development of a more thorough knowledge on how hospitals work.
One of the messages from our review is that hospital activities are better
seen as performed by “teams”. We interpret teams in a very broad sense,
to include the joint effort of several economic agents, in order to achieve an
outcome in the absence of a clear market mechanism (i.e. price) and where
individual accountability is hard to obtain. If one considers the production
of health and well-being of the system as a whole, this idea of team, or
interaction, trascends the limits of the hospital. The interaction between
acute treatment at the hospital and chronic treatment outside the hospital,
and the interaction of primary care at the general practitioner and secondary
care at the hospital specialist through referrals, are clear examples of this.
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